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Abstract 
 
The process of Europeanisation implies a confluence of resources and outputs. This is mainly due to 
both structural constraints (e.g. economic harmonisation) and institutional inputs (e.g. sentences by 
European Court of Justice). In this article a reflection is made on two processes: (a) the adjustment of 
national systems of social protection to operate on a European framework; and (b) the decentralisation 
of ‘safety net’ policies at meso-level in order to favour territorial subsidiarity and democratic 
accountability. In the first section a review of concepts and premises is carried out prior to a general 
reflection on the so-called ‘European social model’. Mesogovernments and the increasing role of EU’s 
regions focus the interest of our third section. Decentralisation and a greater regional say in areas of 
policy-making closer to citizens’ perceptions, such as the weaving of ‘safety nets’, have often been 
linked to cultural or identity considerations. But demands are also grounded on claims for policy 
innovation and a more effective management. A brief examination of the case of Spain’s devolution of 
welfare powers to the regions illustrates such claims. It is concluded that in order to build up a macro 
community of trusts in the ‘Old Continent’ more attention is to be paid on the increasing role of 
medium-size layers of government.  
 
 
 
Concepts and premises 
 
Safety nets 
 
They are bottom-lines of welfare provision and as such they adopt institutionalised 
expressions which vary in degrees and manners. Public programmes of social 
assistance provided on a means-tested basis are basic elements of ‘safety nets’. 
These aim at facilitating citizens and families with means that guarantee the 
satisfaction of minimum vital needs and facilitate civic integration. In many cases these 
programmes are not a social security responsibility, although they may be linked to 
contributory social services and subsidies.  
 
The aggregate of public policies and interventions associated to ‘safety nets’ is often 
fragmented. Benefits and services are generally targeted on different collectives with 
no correlation between them (Eardley et al, 1996). Other intervening factors, such as 
intra-familial transfers, community help, or altruistic help provided by NGOs 
(Non-Governmental Organisations) and Third Sector associations, play also a crucial 
role.  
 
An excessive focus on centrally-run governmental output in the area of welfare 
provision has tended to ignore the impact of those latter factors, which are not easy to 
be measured and assessed in quantitative terms. Studies on welfare development have 
often neglected the importance of the interrelation between state, civil society, family and 
the individual in establishing ‘safety nets’, as well as in providing social cohesion and 
political legitimisation.  
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Indeed, welfare state research has often concentrated on analysing national social 
spending rather that institutions and organisational relations (Esping-Andersen, 1993). 
However, welfare ‘safety nets’ have found in sub-national tiers of government 
important institutional actors of policy innovation which have often been disregarded by 
social policy researchers (Alber, 1995). 
 
The concept of welfare ‘residualism’ is usually correlated to the decline of the 
centralising ‘command-and-control’ planning model. In parallel, a growth of institutional 
‘stateness’, or state penetration of the welfare sphere (Flora, 1986/87), has also been 
noticeable in decentralised countries. Obviously, the concept of ‘stateness’ includes 
the degree of autonomy of state officials in decision-making and implementation of 
public polices at all layers of government (central, regional and local). In line with the to 
traditional Jacobin tenets, there still persists a misinterpretation as a result of making 
synonymous both central government and state institutions,  
 
Europeanisation 
 
The unfolding of structures of governance at a supranational European level is taking 
place by means of formalising interactions between the fifteen members of the 
European Union. These interactions affect mainly to actors and policy networks 
traditionally confined to operate in nation-state arenas. An emerging new layer of 
supra-national government and an internal all-round political concurrence are 
processes well under way. As a multi-level political framework, the European Union is 
a compound of policy processes, and Europeanisation implies that national, regional 
and local policies are to be shaped by considerations beyond the mere centrality of the 
member states.  
 
The process of convergence in the ‘Old Continent’ is commonly referred as 
Europeanisation. It relates to all three economic, political and social domains, and 
comprises countries sharing a somewhat common historical development and 
embracing values of democracy and human rights of an egalitarian nature. However, 
the concept is far from being precise and clear-cut. It is multi-semantic and subject to 
various degrees of understandings and interpretations. Europeanisation is not a static 
concept, but a rather dynamic idea to found expression in the gradual development of 
common institutions in Europe (e.g. Agreement of Schengen, Court of Justice, Euro 
currency).  
 
The constitution of the United States of Europe cannot be regarded as the end-result of 
the process of Europeanisation. The neo-functionalist school of thought has generally 
adopted the view that universal progress requires a kind of integration, which is made 
equal to cultural assimilation, along the lines of the ‘melting-pot’ experience. An 
alternative view of non-homogenising integration puts the emphasis on the historical, 
psychological, and social premises of plural Europe. Pluralists envisage that European 
rules can only be achieved and successfully accommodated by taking into account 
both history and cultural diversity within the mosaic of peoples in the ‘Old Continent’. 
Neo-functionalists usually criticise such an approach as being ‘Euro-pessimistic’, as it 
is not centralised and vertically hierarchical. 
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Decentralisation 
 
The principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the Treaty of European Union of 1992 
(Maastricht Treaty) provides for decisions to be taken supranationally only if local, 
regional or national levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus for 
decision-making is as decentralised and closer to the citizen as possible. Political elites 
of the member states, reluctant to further the process of European institutionalisation, 
interpreted the subsidiarity principle as a safeguard for the preservation of traditional 
national sovereignty and, consequently, the powers to intervene centrally. They placed 
the bottom-line of subsidiarity at the level of the nation-state.  
 
European countries with a decentralised or federal structure of government are keen 
on clarifying the divisions of powers and responsibilities in the future multi-tier 
European Union. Workable schemes should be adopted so that German Länder, 
Italian Regioni, Spanish Comunidades Autónomas, or the British devolved 
administrations, could secure their own inputs at the European level, as well as to 
implement and manage EU decisions at their own level of competence. Regional 
governments have shown resistance to encroachment from Brussels on sub-state 
political action. Consequently, and as a result of the EU’s summit held in Nice in 
December 2000, an agreement was reached to develop a new intergovernmental 
conference that would conclude with a new European Treaty in 2004. Regions and 
mesogovernments in the European Union expect the coming intergovernmental 
conference to reverse a trend to further re-centralisation, not only European-wide but 
also at national level. 
 
Sub-state layers of government have found in the principle of European subsidiarity a 
renewed impulse for the running of public affairs, and new opportunities for policy 
innovation. It also encourages intergovernmental co-operation on the assumption that 
national states will be less ‘sovereign’ than they have been up until now. To meet these 
challenges, the process of democratic institutionalisation of the European Union need 
to acknowledge, in the first place, the diverse processes of state formation and 
nation-building of the constituent member-states.  
 
Along the lines of Stein Rokkan’s ‘macro-model of European political development’, the 
accommodation of cleavage structures forged in centuries of history appeared to be a 
pre-requisite to any political attempt to dismantle internal boundaries in a 
supra-national Europe (Flora et al, 1999). The development of a European 
supra-national welfare state and social policy is, therefore, unlikely in the near future. 
On consolidating welfare ‘safety nets’, national and local cultures will continue to play a 
crucial role in peoples’ expectations, perceptions and values. This area of social 
policy-making is highly shaped by local cultures and life styles, and is less likely to be 
dealt with in a homogenous and centralised manner from a supra-national entity 
(Moreno, 2001a). 
 
 
Model or models of European social protection? 
 
During the ‘Golden Age’ of welfare capitalism (1960-75), West European systems of 
social protection were based upon the assumption of full employment and on the 
complementary role developed by the family, and, in particular, of women’s unpaid work 
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within households (Lewis, 1993, 1997). A confluence of welfarism, keynesianism, 
taylorism and female segregation facilitated a sustained economic growth and the 
generalisation of a type of ‘affluent worker’. However, the effects of the oil crises in 
1973-74 and 1978-79 altered a scenario of prosperity and abundant stable male 
employment. 
 
In the last decades, processes of globalization of the economy and industrial 
transformations have had wide-range effects on the national labour markets. But there 
have also been deep structural modifications as a consequence of the ageing of 
population, the increasing participation of women’ in the formal labour market, and the 
re-arrangements occurred within households as main producers and distributors of 
welfare and well-being. In addition, fiscal crises and the erosion of the ideological 
consensus which gave way to the ‘Mid-century Compromise’1 have also conditioned the 
re-casting of welfare states in Europe.  
 
There is a belief that the ‘European social model’ is something that provides with unity and 
identity to most of EU countries as differentiated to systems where an increasing 
individualisation of welfare is noticeable (USA). However, and viewed from below, such a 
‘European social model’ appears much more diverse as a kaleidoscope of sediments and 
peculiarities (Ferrera, 1996b). Indeed, the systems of social protection within the 
European Union are far from being identical and uniform. Any future scenario for a 
unified EU involvement in the area of policies regarding social protection must take into 
account the present situation of welfare peculiarities. A succinct review of the diverse 
welfare arrangements and institutional configurations within the European Union 
should therefore be clarifying in this respect. To accomplish such a task we refer to the 
‘regime approach’, which has established itself as a useful methodological tool for 
analysing the diversity of welfare in the European Union (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
1999).  
 
The ‘regime approach’ put forward the idea that welfare systems are characterised by 
a particular constellation of economic political and social arrangements. Undoubtedly, 
the ‘regime approach’ has proved to be very persuasive in linking together a wide 
range of elements that are considered to influence welfare outcomes. However, on 
establishing patterns of fixed interaction a certain assumption of continuity tends to 
prevail over that of change. As a consequence, it is implicitly assumed that a particular 
welfare state will tend to sustain interests and arrangements identified within the three 
main categories. These are briefly described as follows: 
 
(a) The corporatist Continental is characterised by a concerted action between 
employers and trade unions, and financed by contributions made by them. Welfare 
policies by state institutions uphold this arrangement, which is organised through social 
insurance. There is a sharp distinction between labour market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  
 
(b) The liberal Anglo-Saxon is patterned by its commitment to universality, financed by 
taxes and incorporating residual means-tested services and flat-rate benefits. It has 
pursued a shift toward market principles, involving deregulation of the labour market, 
wage flexibility and containment in social expenditure. 
 
(c) The social-democratic Nordic is Premised on the harmonisation of egalitarian ideas 
with growth and full employment, and the minimisation of family dependence. It is 
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financed by taxes, characterised by the principle of universality, and favouring the 
public provision of services rather than cash transfers. 
 
To the well-known three-fold categorisation of welfare regimes, a fourth 
South-European or Mediterranean category can be delimited (Ferrera, 1996a; Rhodes, 
1996; Moreno 2000). The discussion revolves around the contention whether the 
Mediterranean type of welfare is simply lagging behind those of the ‘continental’ model 
of social insurance to which they belong (Katrougalos 1996). Or else, whether it is a 
mere ‘Latin rim’ characterised by a rudimentary level of social provision and 
institutional development (Leibfried 1992; Gough 1996). In broad terms, similar 
social-demographic trends, macro-economic constraints and pattern of public policy 
can be observed in all four South European countries (Giner, 1986, Morlino, 1998; 
Castles, 1998). 
 
Beyond the discussion on both parsimony and variance reduction in the classification of 
welfare regimes (see Table 1), a confluence in the level of public expenditure and in 
organisational arrangements among EU countries is noticeable. The adaptation of the 
European labour markets to global competition have undoubtedly induced such a 
convergence. After the implementation of the Euro currency next steps in the process 
of Europeanisation will involve tax harmonisation and convergence in labour costs.  
 
If a reduction in the protecting intensity of welfare benefits, together with a hardening of 
the criteria of access and eligibility to welfare entitlements is observable in Central and 
Northern Europe, trends in Southern Europe have run in a somewhat opposite 
direction. From a Continental-like contributory system of social security, recent reforms 
implemented in Mediterranean countries have pointed towards generalisation --and 
even universalisation-- of benefits and services (e.g. education, health, 
non-contributory pensions). In the case of Britain, welfare reforms have put an 
emphasis in workfare in trying to avoid universal ‘dependent’ welfare. Such a course of 
action has implicitly adopted the philosophy of the ‘contributory principle’, although a 
transfer of responsibilities from the state public to the profit-making private sector is the 
underlying trend.  
 
Among the various factors affecting this observable trend towards ‘unity’ in social 
policy provision developed by the European member states, macro-structural 
constraints such as external social dumping, industrial relocation and financial 
globalization are to be accounted for. But the European institutional inputs are also of 
the foremost importance, particularly those related to European law and European 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. Let us refer to one appearing to be most compelling. 
 
According to art. 2 of the EC Treaty provided the EC legislator with the competence to 
harmonise provisions of the national systems of social security in order to secure the 
freedom of movement of workers. Accordingly, the impact of European law on social 
security matters is growing in importance and has a potential of far-reaching 
consequences. In recent times, social policy matters have been brought to the 
forefront of EU interests. The Social Charter on the right of workers, as well as the 
agreement on social policy of the Maastricht Treaty and its inclusion in the Amsterdam 
Treaty as a separate chapter on social policy, have meant significant steps in the 
direction of developing the ‘Social Europe’. 
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Unquestionably, a decisive institutional input shaping the future of social security in the 
European Union is constituted by jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. The 
decision of 1998 on the Kohll and the Decker2 cases constituted a turning point in the 
juridical concept of the relation between EU law and national health insurance laws. 
The Court ruled that, in the absence of harmonisation at the EU level, each member 
state could determine the conditions concerning the right and duty to be insured with a 
social security scheme, as well as for the establishment of the conditions for 
entitlement to benefits. Nevertheless, and this was the crucial aspect of the Court’s 
decision, national member states should comply with European law when exercising 
their powers to organise their social security systems (Kötter, 1999). 
 
Whether the Kohll and Decker rulings by the Court of Justice will have a ‘visible’ impact 
on an area of national ‘exclusive’ competence is something which remains to be seen.3 
The weight of the institutional inputs produced by the Court’s jurisprudence will have 
the highest levels of legitimacy in the process of building up the ‘Social Europe’. Up 
until now, decisions and rulings by the Court have enjoyed an uncontested degree of 
legitimacy vis-à-vis national interests defended by the governments of the member 
states. At the root of such attitude lies the acceptance not only that political life in 
Europe depends on the rule of law, but the conviction that human rights and values of 
an egalitarian nature are embraced by EU countries without exception.  
 
 
Mesogovernments and welfare development 
 
Higher degrees of uncertainty for wide social collectives -- who were covered in the past 
by social protection schemes and now face increasing vulnerability-- are the 
consequence of recent social and economic transformations. Given this context, ‘safety 
nets’ have become focal points of attention. There is a growing European concern 
expressed in those EU programmes set to combat poverty and social exclusion. The EU 
Commission ‘Strategic Objectives’ for the period 2000-2005 envisage a reform of 
social protection based on solidarity that can remain fair, caring and inclusive in a 
climate of “...cautious pubic spending” (Commission, 2000). According to these 
Commission views, the new European governance is not considered the ‘exclusive’ 
responsibility of European Union institutions. Neither national governments nor 
national parliaments are regarded as being the sole actors of European governance. 
Instead, regional and local authorities and the regions are regarded as decisive 
emerging actors.  
 
Bottom-up Europeanisation and top-down decentralisation have allowed a 
considerable extension of a type of European cosmopolitan localism, and the 
increasing role of sub-state governments in the provision of community-centred 
policies (Moreno, 1999). This is reflected in both societal interests, which are aimed at 
developing a sense of local community and at participating simultaneously in the global 
context (Strange, 1996). In this respect, the role played by medium-size polities is 
acquiring relevance in most aspects of contemporary life. In Europe, the renewal of 
community life4 at the meso-level derives mainly from the combination of two main 
factors: a growing rejection of centralisation at the national level coupled with a 
strengthening of supranational politics, and a reinforcement of local identities and 
societal cultures with an territorial underpinning.  
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In policy making, mesogovernments are no longer dependent on the state building 
programs of rationalisation carried out during the XIX and XX centuries. 
Regionally-based entrepreneurs, social leaders and members of the intelligentsia have 
adopted many of the initiatives and roles once reserved for ‘enlightened’ elites, who in 
the past held the reins of power at the centre of their nation states. Positions of 
influence are now more evenly distributed in central, meso-level and local institutions. 
The co-option of regional elites to the central institutions of government is no longer the 
exclusive route available to ‘successful’ political careers. 
 
What is acquiring major relevance within the supranational framework provided by 
Europeanisation is a re-assertion of sub-state identities. Manifestations of such 
developments in Western Europe do not circumscribe to electoral deviations within 
national contexts (e.g. CSU-Bavaria, CiU-Catalonia, Lega-Northern Italy, 
SNP-Scotland). Social movements and industrialists of the ‘new economy’ have found 
a more flexible context for action at the regional level. Central state apparatuses are 
often clumsy and inefficient in dealing with bottom-up initiatives. Medium-size nation 
states (Denmark or Finland), stateless nations (Catalonia or Scotland), regions 
(Brussels or Veneto) and metropolitan areas (London or Berlin) are well equipped for 
carrying out innovation policies in a more integrated Europe. In particular, the quest of 
medium-size communities to run their own affairs and to develop their potentialities 
outside the dirigiste control of central state institutions is to be underlined. 
 
Claims for a greater regional say in areas of policy-making closer to citizens’ 
perceptions are not only based on cultural or identity considerations, but also on the 
accomplishment of a better management of welfare programmes associated to the 
weaving of ‘safety nets’. Deconcentration and decentralisation of social services have 
had a much larger impact than privatisation in Southern European. Programmes of 
‘minimum income guaranteed’ constitute important materials in the process of weaving 
such ‘safety nets’. The case of their implementation in Spain offers a good illustration of 
the growing role mesogovernments are developing. 
 
Spain’s devolution and the development of ‘safety nets’ 
 
In 1988, the Basque Government announced the implementation of a regional Plan de 
Lucha contra la Pobreza (‘Programme against Poverty’). This innovative policy 
sparked off a regional mimesis, or ‘demonstration effect’, on the part of the other 16 
Spanish Comunidades Autónomas. By the end of 1990s, all Spanish 
mesogovernments had implemented regional programmes of minimum income 
guaranteed, which combine means-tested cash benefits with policies of social insertion 
(primarily employment promotion and vocation training schemes).  
 
Regional parliaments had passed legislation allowing Spanish mesogovernments to 
develop integrated networks of social services. These pieces of legislation were based 
upon the constitutional principle which entitled them to request ‘devolved powers’. The 
criteria for the implementation of the new regional networks of social policy and welfare 
services established that local governments were to carry out the bulk of service 
provision. However, the powers of legislation, planning, and co-ordination with the 
private and altruistic sectors would rest upon regional executives and legislatures. 
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Networks of social services were considered by the Spanish regional laws as 
integrated public systems with unrestricted access to all citizens. Traditional public 
beneficence was ‘updated’ in order to avoid stigmatisation of the beneficiaries. The 
general aim shared by the Spanish mesogovernments was one of modernisation of the 
social services by means of taken into account in a more efficient manner the needs 
expressed by users, as well as their complaints and ‘feedback’.  
 
With the purpose of rationalising and adapting the provision of new social services, the 
idea of the ‘welfare mix’ was also embraced enthusiastically. The combination of efforts 
with private and altruistic organisations has proved to be very effective in the 
implementation of programmes to combat poverty and in the gradual weaving of 
‘safety nets’. Non-profit and voluntary organisations, in particular, were incorporated in 
the general provision of social services, and many of them were subsidised by the 
regional public systems of social services (Moreno and Arriba, 1999).  
 
Welfare policies to combat social exclusion developed by the Spanish 
mesogovernments followed EU recommendations, some of which were put into 
practice by neighbouring France. First implemented in December 1988, the French 
RMI (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion) aimed at establishing a linkage between the receipt 
of the benefits and the objective of insertion for beneficiaries in their communities of 
residence. Deconcentration of the management of the programme at the regional and 
local level was implemented. This policy was geared towards adapting the general 
objective of social insertion with the characteristics and structural constraints of those 
local communities concerned.  
 
In France, as in the case of the Spanish mesogovernments, programmes of minimum 
income guaranteed have been conceptualised as public instruments to ‘fill in the gaps’ 
of the contributory systems of the social security. Let us remember that with the growth 
of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s, increasing numbers of ‘new poor’ who had 
formerly gainful jobs in ‘lame-duck’ or non-competitive industries, had to face situations 
in which contributory unemployment benefits ran out. The new social assistance 
benefits were granted to them not so much as former gainfully employees confronting 
permanent unemployment, but as citizens entitled to minimum income for purposes of 
social insertion. 
 
The expansion of social assistance programmes has meant an increasing economic 
burden for local authorities and regions, which runs somewhat contrary to general 
aspirations of cost containment at national level. Let us remind that in many European 
countries, central treasuries finance regional budgets with transfer from general 
taxation by means of ‘block grants’. But the key element to be considered in this 
respect is whether the final destination of such funds is ‘earmarked’ or non-categorical.  
 
Once again, the case of Spain illustrates the potentialities for policy innovation and 
rationalisation of costs when policies of welfare ‘safety nets’ are a regional 
responsibility within a general framework of non-discrimination. Spanish 
mesogovernments have the final budgetary say in the running of ab novo programmes, 
which have been the product of their own political initiative. This usually implies the 
setting of budgetary priorities within the aggregate of policies and services to be 
complied statutorily. Certainly, the Basque Country and Navarre with a system of fiscal 
quasi-independence5 have been able to fund more generously their programmes of 
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minimum income guaranteed. Nevertheless, the setting of political priorities in policy 
funding appears to be the most compelling explanatory element. Mesogovernments 
have found new arenas for political legitimisation with the autonomous implementation 
of welfare programmes (Moreno, 2001b).  
 
It remains to be seen whether these welfare programmes will continue to be a priority for 
the Spanish mesogovernments. Up until now the expansion regional public expenditure 
has allowed the financing of ‘safety net’ policies. Table 2 shows the territorial re-allocation 
of public spending in the last twenty years, with an impressive expansion of regional 
expenditure.  
 
By extension, the potential role to be played by the European mesogovernments in the 
development of ‘safety nets’ is large. They are well placed at an intermediate level to 
integrate social services and social assistance policies into a common network. The 
ever-latent risk of exacerbating inter-regional inequalities in welfare provision will 
greatly depend on the political commitment shown by EU countries to make social 
cohesion a priority.  
 
In financial terms, differences in policy outcomes might be dependent upon the 
spending of the mesogovernments. The degree of financial autonomy for the design 
and implementation of welfare policies highly conditions the capacity of policy 
innovation. As has been commented on in the case of Spain, the fact that the Basque 
Government had sufficient resources has been a key factor in the development of the 
minimum income guaranteed programme since 1989. This in turn provoked a ‘domino 
effect’ in the rest of the Spanish regions, which paradoxically did not have the same 
financial manoeuvrability as the Basque Country. However, not wanting to be left 
behind they were able to finance their programmes, although some regions have not 
been as ‘generous’ as the in the Basque and Navarran ones.  
 
The possible exacerbation of inter-regional inequalities can be linked to the discussion 
on the ‘welfare tourism’, which was initially analysed in the USA. The main argument 
here revolves around the contention that poor and excluded would change their 
residence in order to obtain more generous welfare benefits. Such a behaviour would 
initiate a ‘vicious circle’ by penalising financially those states and communities which 
make extra budgetary efforts in favour of more comprehensive and generous welfare 
programmes. However the argument does not seem to have the same degree of 
plausibility in the case of Europe, since the level of geographical mobility is much 
lesser than in the USA, and were social bonds, kin and networks of friends have a 
much greater influence in people’s attachment to their territorial contexts. Besides, 
cultural factors are also crucial aspects which deter ‘welfare tourism’. These include 
not only linguistic barriers and differences in customs and habits, but also a more 
accessible path towards social insertion. In fact, territorial identities at regional and 
local level can provide better means for insertion for the excluded. 
 
Further arguments supporting local and regional involvement in the ‘weaving’ of 
welfare ‘safety nets’ concern the maximisation of available information for 
policy-makers, and a better ‘tailoring’ of insertion programmes according to the needs 
of local employment. Critics draw attention to the fact than an excessive autonomy of 
the richer regions would be in detriment of the poorer ones. Such a course of action 
could widen the gap between more developed and less developed regions, and the 
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fuelling of regional comparative grievances. All things considered, a better access of 
civil society to political decision-making at the meso-level can be regarded as the 
means for fortifying accountability in a global order that put at risk the democratic 
quality of post-industrial societies.  
 
 
Conclusion: decentralisation and subsidiarity 
 
The provision of social policies according to the principle of decentralisation and 
subsidiarity opens up new opportunities for policy innovation at the regional level. 
Mesogovernments, and medium-size states, are no longer dependent on state-centred 
welfare programmes or supra-national EU intervention provided in a hierarchical 
manner.  
 
Subsidiarity favours the participation of sub-state layers of government in the running 
of public policies, among which social provision appears to be an obvious priority. At 
the same time, it encourages intergovernmental co-operation on the assumption that 
the role of the national states would be less hierarchical than its has been up until now.6 
Territorial identities, as sources of legitimacy, are intertwined in a manner that express 
the degrees of citizens’ attachments to the various institutional levels: municipalities, 
regions, nations, states, and European Union.  
 
The implementation of regional systems of social protection and welfare ‘safety nets’ is 
in line with the assumption that a more efficient welfare provision is plausible by means 
of a more effective development of community care services. It appears more suitable 
for purposes of monitoring means-tested programmes, and for optimising economies 
of scale. Besides, it provides for institutional means to facilitate democratic 
accountability at both meso and local levels.  
 
Democratic accountability and full involvement of citizens were given priority by Prodi’s 
Commission in a fully-fledged statement at the beginning of the millennium 
(Commission, 2000). The ways and means by which territorial subsidiarity and 
democratic accountability are envisaged in the future European governance concerns 
the decentralisation of day-to-day programmes and tasks. The difficulties of 
implementing transnational policies from Brussels, particularly in the area of social 
policy and welfare development, were implicitly acknowledged in such a statement. 
Further to this, the agreement taken at the 2000 Nice summit in order to work out a EU 
treaty in 2004 based upon a new intergovernmental balance of powers seems to give 
support to the quest for more extensive decentralisation.  
 
Efforts of Europeanisation in order to build up a macro community of trusts, which 
would dismantle internal boundaries, need to be reoriented towards transferring more 
responsibilities to the regional layer of government. Europeanisation would thus 
develop into a meaningful system by incorporating existing cultural systems and 
collective identities of both national and sub-national levels. These interact in a 
differential and contingent manner and should be integrated --rather than assimilated-- 
into a process of convergence. In this way, Europeanisation would avoid to be seen as 
an exogenous process, which is superimposed on the internal interaction of 
communities with long-standing culture and history.  
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Endnotes 
 
 
1. By which there was a conciliation between a primary framework of property ownership and social 
rights in advanced industrial countries representative of welfare capitalism. This mutual concession 
made feasible the institutionalisation of conflicts latent between capitalist inequalities and equalities 
derived from mass citizenship (Crouch, 1999). 
 
2. Mr. Kohll, a Luxembourg citizen, had requested the authorisation for dental treatment of his daughter 
in Germany (Trier). Mr. Decker, also a Luxembourg citizen, had solicited the reimbursement of 
spectacles with corrective lenses he had purchased in Belgium. In both cases, national social security 
administrations rejected both claims. Kohll and Decker appealed subsequently to the European Court of 
Justice. 
 
3. On the allegation that the financial implications of this ruling could undermine the balance of the 
national systems of social security, the Court held the view that the reimbursement of costs at a flat-rate, 
or in accordance with the tariff of the established in the country of origin, would have no effect on the 
financial equilibrium of the national social security system. 
 
4. European community life should be seen as distinct from that prescribed in North America for local 
communities (Etzioni, 1993). In the case of the USA, many of the communitarian experiences may be 
regarded as reactions to specific social cleavages and pressing social fractures (the criminalisation of 
social life), as instrumental means of socialisation in response to urban constriction (suburban 
isolationism), or as alternative lifestyles to dominant values (possessive individualism). Thus, 
North-American communitarianism can be seen mainly as socially defensive.  
 
5. Spanish mesogovernments collect main taxes such as income tax, corporation tax and VAT and 
(since 1997) those corresponding to ‘special taxes’ (petrol, tobacco and spirits). Basque and Navarran 
institutions collect practically all taxes. Subsequently, they transfer a previously agreed quota to the 
Spanish central treasury. These transfers represent compensation for Spanish common expenditure, 
and to cover the costs of running those state administrative bodies located in the Basque Country and 
Navarre. Note that as compared with the autonomous public spending in Catalonia, the Basque regional 
per capita expenditure is 1,8 higher. According to 1995 data, the mean non-financial per capita spending 
carried out by Catalonia amounted to 1,373 Euro, which compared to 2,508 Euro in the Basque Country. 
 
6. This would take full advantage of a period of peace and relatively stable economic growth 
characterised by the absence of wars between once powerful nation-states. The ever-latent possibility 
of rivalries between nation-states is nevertheless potentially explosive (Chomsky, 1994). 
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Table 1: Features of European Welfare Regimes 
 
 
 ANGLO-SAXON CONTINENTAL NORDIC MEDITERRANEAN 
IDEOLOGY Citizenship Neo-corporatism Egalitarianism Social justice 
GOALS Individual choice Income maintenance Network public services Resource optimisation 
FINANCING Taxes Payroll contributions  Taxes Mixed  
BENEFITS Flat rate (low intensity) Cash (high intensity) Flat rate (high intensity) Cash (low intensity) 
SERVICES Residual public Social partners Comprehensive public Family support 
PROVISION Public/quasi markets NGOs Public / Centrally fixed Mixed / Decentralised 
LABOUR MARKET De-regulation Insiders/outsiders High public employment Big informal economy 
GENDER Female polarisation Part-time feminisation Occupational specific Ambivalent familialism 
POVERTY Dependency culture Insertion culture Statist culture Assistance culture 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) 
 
 
 19811 1984 1987 1990 1992 1997 20002 
CENTRAL 87.3 75.6 72.6 66.2 63.0 59.5 54 
REGIONAL 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 23.2 26.9 33 
LOCAL 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.8 13.6 13 
 
1 Beginning of the process of devolution 
2 Government’s estimates 
 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations (MAP, 1997). 
 
